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ABSTRACT
Despite significant progress, women in the legal profession still
have not advanced into positions of power at near the rate in which
they saturate the legal market. Scholars agree that simply waiting for
parity is not sufficient, and, thus, they have identified many of the
barriers that contribute to women’s difficulties. To date, however, the
role that scientific and medical understandings play on the evolution of
law, and on women as lawyers, has not received examination until
now. To this end, I posit that medicine played a significant role in
shaping societal expectations and assumptions about gender, and was
similarly influenced by already-existing societal assumptions about
gender. This created a complex and substantial barrier that kept
women from exploring options outside the “spheres” of society they
traditionally occupied. This article explores how medically-supported
gender theories, in practice, have actually operated to limit women’s
professional progress, relegating them to traditional gender roles and
halting their ascension in the ranks of the legal profession. I examine
how this barrier operates in three ways: how early women lawyers
adopted these medical theories into views about their own gender; how
society and those around these early women lawyers adopted these
views to shape expectations about women as lawyers; and how the
court explicitly and implicitly relied on these assumptions about
gender to keep women out of the legal profession. An examination of
how these medical and scientific theories about gender have shaped
the ways society views gender, and vice versa, can help illuminate the
discussion on the barriers that impede modern women lawyers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Historical, Scientific, and Medical Understanding of Gender:
How It Shaped the Legal System of the United States
This paper was inspired by reading the experiences of an early
female lawyer1 in the United States who briefly mentioned limitations
placed on her sex2 by the medical community, attributing them as a
barrier to her ability to practice law. While scholars have explored the
multiple barriers that have held women back from progressing further
in society, one aspect scholars have not fully considered is how the
medical understanding of both biological sex and gender has impacted
women’s struggles. Modern scientific understanding does not seem to
question women’s capacity to reason and exert themselves mentally
without sacrificing reproductive capability, but an early understanding
of the female reproductive system cautioned against women taking
part in academic or intellectual endeavors, arguing that such
limitations were necessary for the good of society.3 Medical advances
often ended up significantly harming women, to the point where
natural aspects of their biological sex were themselves viewed as
symptoms, and, thus, women as a gender were viewed as “diseased.”4
In this paper, I explore how these medical understandings of
gender, biological sex, and sexuality, stemming from the Victorian era
and traced to modern times, have impacted women within the legal

1

Virginia G. Drachman, Letters from 1888, Letter from Ellen A. Martin, in WOMEN
LAWYERS AND THE ORIGINS OF PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY IN AMERICA 73, 114 (1993)
(“In addition to the difficulty of acquiring an acquaintance among business people
and a general knowledge of affairs, women have to contend, unless very robust and
healthy, with a physical condition that is very trying. I refer to the close relation
between the brain and the organs peculiar to women, and to the fact that any trouble
with those organs (and a celebrated anatomist says they seem made to get out of
order) seriously affects the brain and the nervous system.”).
2
For the purposes of this paper, when I refer to “sex,” I mean biological sex. When I
refer to “sexuality,” I mean sexual acts. When I refer to “gender,” I mean the
societal interpretation of sex based on historical context. The medical research and
much of society during the time period that I discuss blurred the lines between these
terms, using them interchangeably. So, the scientific understanding of “biological
sex” ultimately used a pseudo-scientific rationale to define gender in society and the
courts.
3
For further discussion on the history and the multiple elements of societal
acceptance of women as inferior (religion, science, history), and a thorough
discussion on Victorian construction of womanhood, see CYNTHIA EAGLE RUSSET,
SEXUAL SCIENCE: THE VICTORIAN CONSTRUCTION OF WOMANHOOD 205-06 (1989)
(discussing how science was used to validate the natural inferiority of women).
4
See discussion infra note 10.
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system. A full exploration into how the medical understanding of
women’s health has shaped laws and court interpretations is beyond
the scope of this paper; here I focus specifically on women lawyers’
experiences within the legal system.5 The language of early court
cases addressing whether women could function as lawyers points to
preconceptions based on medical understanding of natural ability, thus
relegating women to these prescribed roles within society.6 Medical
theories of gendered diseases found their way into both common law
and statutory language.7 In reality, however, societal norms and
expectations shaped (and still shape) medical theories significantly.
Reflecting on the societal norms throughout history, law was not
viewed as a realm in which women were “naturally” equipped to
participate.8 This understanding of what women were capable of
stemmed in large part from the medical community, which, I argue,
was in turn influenced by societal expectations.
I posit that medical understandings of gender actually placed
undue limitations on women in society, relegating them to their
traditional gender roles and maintaining the societal status quo, despite
evidence challenging these traditional notions. I support this theory by
focusing on women’s experiences within the legal system as lawyers.
The rationale for a focus in this area is simple: this is the primary area
where women would have been able to challenge traditional gender
roles using the legal system, had they been allowed. The access of
women to the courts from within them, as lawyers, would have
arguably been the most effective way to effectuate change in the way

5

The primary focus of my paper will be on the impact that medicalizing gender had
on early women lawyers and its impact on women lawyers today. However, another
area where medicalizing gender has had a comparable impact is on women within
the legal system as rape victims.
6
See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (denying a female lawyer a
license to practice law based on the “wide difference in the respective spheres and
destinies of man and woman”).
7
See Vivian Berger, Man’s Trial, Woman’s Tribulation: Rape Cases in the
Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 69 n.394 (1977) (citing Michigan v. Bastian, 47
N.W.2d 692, 695 (1951) (holding that an alleged rapist should be allowed to proffer
evidence that his alleged victim was a “nymphomaniac” who brought the sexual
encounter upon herself)).
8
See, e.g., EDWARD H. CLARKE, SEX IN EDUCATION; OR, A FAIR CHANCE FOR THE
GIRLS (Charles E. Rosenberg ed., Arno Press 1972) (1873); see also M.D.T. DE
BIENVILLE, NYMPHOMANIA, OR, A DISSERTATION CONCERNING THE FUROR
UTERINUS 29-30 (Edward Sloane Wilmot trans., London 1775) (listing descriptions
of causes for nymphomania and methods for cure, describing those afflicted with the
disease as “debauched” and “dangerous,” and describing those most likely to
experience it as “young widows, especially if death hath deprived them of a strong
and vigorous man”).
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the legal system treated and understood women. Therefore, denying
women access to the bar kept them relegated to their traditional roles
and kept them subjugated by the system without any means to enact
change.
First, in Part II, I discuss how society shapes the discourse on
disease. I delve into how the medical profession was shaped by
societal expectations and how the medical profession in turn shaped
societal expectations based on gender. In Part III, I discuss the
concept of medicalization and how it relates to the modern day
struggles and barriers for women in the legal profession. I then
examine how medicalizing gender, by imprinting societal expectations
of women into their very biological makeup, played a role in shaping
how women viewed themselves, how society viewed them, and how
the law treated them. In Part IV, I trace the history of medical
understandings about sex and gender and discuss how it shaped
societal understandings and impacted women. I primarily focus on the
biological and neurological medical theories about women during the
time period when the first female lawyers were seeking acceptance
into the legal system of the United States. Next, I turn to the
symptoms and treatments of “female illnesses” and examine how they
were shaped by societal norms. I then address how these medical
theories made their way into the language of the courts and how they
impacted the first female lawyers in the United States.
II. DISEASE AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT
A. Historical Understanding of Women’s Health: How the Doctors
Shaped the Discourse
i.

How Society Shapes Disease

The role that scientific and medical understandings play on the
evolution of law has not received as much attention as other formative
contributors, but it has been significant. In practice, science and
medicine gave weight and authority to theories on proper gender roles,
as prescribed by biology. However, gender roles that were already in
place actually were shaping science and medicine at the same time. In
reality, “[d]isease is a scientific representation of illness that involves
both a sorting of symptoms into discrete entities and a theorizing about
causation and cure. As such, disease is not discovered but created.”9

9

Nancy M. Theriot, Women’s Voices in Nineteenth-Century Medical Discourse: A
Step Toward Deconstructing Science, 19 SIGNS 1, 3 (1993).
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Therefore, disease is necessarily shaped to some extent by societal
norms and expectations. This idea is supported, generally, by the
theory of “medicalization,” a theory in the field of medical sociology
that was introduced to the United States in the 1950s.10 This concept
acknowledges the power of medicine to “define and regulate social
action.”11 Thus, this cyclical relationship between societal norms and
scientific and medical evidence validated certain gender roles within
society that often placed women below men in the societal structure.
On the one hand, notions of female inferiority—
physical, mental, and moral—dating as they did from
antiquity, could hardly be considered novel. On the
other hand, by virtue of the specificity of detail and
inclusiveness of theory at its command, science was
able to provide a newly plausible account of this
inferiority.
Measuring limbs, pondering viscera,
reckoning up skulls, the new mandarins of gender
difference were able to spell out in chapter and verse
the manifold distinctions of sex.12
With research into the interaction of science, medicine, society,
and the law, it is clear that “[s]cientific ideas did more than reflect the
status quo; they helped maintain it.”13 Examining the experiences of
women in the law provides particularly telling examples of the role
that medical (and thus, societal) understandings of sex and gender
played, because it shows how these understandings were indoctrinated
and subtly worked against women from inside the system. Noga
Morag-Levine, Professor of Law at Michigan State University College
of Law, notes that health justifications had been used for legislative
measures impacting and limiting the rights of women beginning in
early nineteenth-century Britain and progressed into the U.S. court
system, exemplified during the Lochner era with the so-called

10

See generally TALCOTT PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 289 (Routledge 1991)
(1951) (proposing that the “therapeutic process” through medicine acts as social
control in eradicating deviance); MEDICALIZED MASCULINITIES 2-3 (Dana Rosenfeld
& Christopher A. Faircloth eds., 2006) (explaining that Parsons’ theory of sick
individuals as “deviant,” and medicine as controlling that deviance, led to the wider
acceptance of medicalization as a theory in the 1970s); Elianne Riska, Gendering the
Medicalization Thesis, 7 ADVANCES IN GENDER RES. 59 (2003) (discussing how the
medicalization thesis impacted and regulated social behavior as a culture and as a
profession).
11
MEDICALIZED MASCULINITIES, supra note 10, at 2.
12
RUSSET, supra note 3, at 205.
13
Id. at 206.
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“Brandeis Brief.”14 In this paper, I explore how, throughout history,
the understanding of female sex, gender, and sexuality by the medical
community has greatly shaped and, in practice, stunted the societal
understanding and acceptance of the role of women as lawyers in the
United States.
ii.

The Power of Medical Authority

My focus is on how the early medical understanding of gender
was used in the legal system to subjugate women and relegate them to
their traditional roles, but also recognizing that some scholars may see
this view as being too simplistic.15 However, I do not argue that only
men used the medical understanding of female health to subjugate
women, but recognize the role that women often played as both
patients and physicians in this discourse.16 Nor do I argue that
utilizing medical understandings about gender was necessarily
consciously used to maintain the status quo—the motivation was likely
subconscious, reflecting a bias to preserve a societal structure that was
familiar and “safe.” I seek to investigate the medical community’s
understanding of female health in the context of how it interplayed
with the societal and legal understanding of the capacities of women as
a class of people.

14

See Noga Morag-Levine, Facts, Formalism, and the Brandeis Brief: The Origins
of a Myth, U. ILL. L. REV. 59-60 (2013) (discussing medical studies and health
rationales in the law in the context of labor laws). Morag-Levine also notes the
importance of the Lochner court’s rejection of presumptive constitutionality and its
resulting adoption of a “newfound necessity to substantiate the claim on the
connection between limits on the workday and better health” with judicial scrutiny of
the legislative facts. Id. at 63. This entire process was necessarily shaped by the
scientific information and understanding made available by the Bradeis Brief to the
legislators and courts at the time. Id. at 90-91. This duality and crossover opened
the door, beginning in Britain from the early nineteenth-century, for the health and
societal interaction, which shaped how medical understandings of gender would be
used in the law to relegate women to their societally-accepted roles.
15
See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (1982). Gilligan explores the theory that there are innate
differences in male and female morality and delves into different psychological
theories, which I do not do in-depth here, but instead include under the impact of
“medicine” in general.
16
See Theriot, supra note 9, at 2. Theriot takes an interdisciplinary view and argues
that “there was lively debate among nineteenth-century physicians over both gender
and science; that women physicians, for professional, gender-specific reasons,
articulated a self-interested view of women’s insanity and nervousness; and that
women patients were active participants in the process of medicalizing woman.” Id.
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The danger in using “scientific” or “medical” rationales to
justify perceptions and assumptions about the different sexes is that
this language connotes neutrality because of the scientific
community’s roots in neutral experimentation and raw data. However,
in reality, as Professor Carol Gilligan notes, theories that were
“formerly considered to be sexually neutral in their scientific
objectivity are found instead to reflect a consistent observational and
evaluative bias.”17 So, while there may have been women participants
in medicalizing women, this discussion focuses on how the biases
forming medical understanding—by whomever they were shaped—
intersected with the legal subjugation of women.
The structure of the U.S. legal system is such that the court was
the forum in which laws were interpreted. Necessarily, interpretation
of law is based on historical and societal norms and acceptance.18
After all, those who interpreted the laws were members of society,
held the same assumptions, and accepted prevailing theories as fact as
reflecting the time period.19 Thus, the courts very well may have been
effectuating deeply embedded societal stereotypes about women from
inside the very system that protected and granted rights to citizens. A
biased view of the sexes grounded in science was pervasive in every
aspect of society, not just in medicine. Gilligan notes “how
accustomed we have become to seeing life through men’s eyes,”20
shaping not only the early medical field (dominated by men), but
language (The Elements of Style21 used examples of English usage
focusing on accomplishments of men), psychological theories (Freud
and the Oedipus Complex, implicitly adopting male life as the norm),22
and, in the 1880s, even clothing (confining women to corsets and other
confining apparel, “conducive, not to action, but to standing”23).

17

GILLIGAN, supra note 15, at 6.
See, e.g., Thomas Earl Geu, Policy and Science: A Review Essay of Wilson’s
Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge, 44 S.D. L. REV. 612, 653 (1998)) (agreeing
that law is a reflection of societal norms); Cecil VanDevender, How Self-Restriction
Laws Can Influence Societal Norms and Address Problems of Bounded Rationality,
96 GEO. L.J. 1775, 1790 (2008) (recognizing that as much as legislatures reflect on
society’s norms, governments also, in turn, affect those norms through laws).
19
See VanDevender, supra note 18, at 1790.
20
GILLIGAN, supra note 15, at 6.
21
WILLIAM STRUNK, JR. & E.B. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE (1959).
22
GILLIGAN, supra note 15, at 6.
23
SUSAN J. HUBERT, QUESTIONS OF POWER: THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S MADNESS
NARRATIVES 59 (2002) (citing ROSE NETZORG KERR, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF
COSTUMES IN AMERICA 23 (1951)). In the 1880s, “[t]he resignation of women to a
role of dependency was signified by the wearing of a dress based upon a feature of
dress design which made women practically helpless.” Id.
18
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Similarly, the existing laws that subjugated women based on
the medical understanding of their gender were far-reaching. They
covered every aspect of life, from property rights24 to professional
rights,25 to criminal rights.26 There are, then, multiple areas of the law
that demonstrate the detrimental impact that incorporating flawed
medical understanding and diagnoses based on sex has on the rights of
women. However, the experiences of the first female lawyers is a
particularly compelling example, because it is one of the only areas
where scientific theories about gender were explicitly used to shape the
laws governing women.

24

See, e.g., In re Strittmater’s Estate, 53 A.2d 205 (N.J. 1947). There, the court
found that decedent, a woman who had tried to leave her estate to the National
Women’s Party (of which she had been a member for eleven years), lacked
testamentary capacity and found her will to be invalid. Id. at 205-06. The lower
court cited “feminism to a neurotic extreme” as evidence of her lacking testamentary
capacity. Id. at 205. The court found that “[s]he regarded men as a class with an
insane hatred” and was diagnosed by a medical witness as suffering from “paranoia
of the Bleuler type of split personality.” Id.; see also JESSE DUKEMINIER, ROBERT H.
SITKOFF & JAMES LINDGREN, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 169 n.2, 171 (8th ed.
2009) (discussing that the court references Swiss psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler (18571939) and noting the extent to which “notions of capacity and insane delusion [are]
based on social constructions of what is ‘normal’”).
25
Beyond the discussion of the first female lawyers, Morag-Levine mentions that
even within the Brandeis Brief, health effects of women were exemplified in terms
of appearance, a social construct. See Morag-Levine, supra note 14. “In the cotton
mills at Fitchburg the women and children are pale, crooked, and sickly-looking.
The women appear dispirited.” Id. at 67 n.44 (citing Brief for Defendant in Error,
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (No. 107)).
26
For example, rape laws reflected assumptions about the biologically mandated
“nature” of men and women. It is telling that defenses to a rape claim brought by a
woman often cited the medical diagnosis of “nymphomania.” See CAROL
GRONEMAN, NYMPHOMANIA: A HISTORY 100-01 (2001). However, what is
interesting is that “the male equivalent of nymphomania, satyriasis, was diagnosed
far less frequently and treated quite differently. Specifically, the symptoms of
flirting, seductive glances, and other behavior sometimes labeled nymphomania in
women did not constitute a disease in men.” Id. at xx-xxi. Further, elements of a
rape claim requiring force and non-consent, as defined by early rape statutes,
reflected assumptions about a man’s aggressive nature and a woman’s nature to
resist. Id. at 99 n.18. In fact, “a doctor wrote in 1913 that rape wasn’t really easy,
because ‘the mere crossing of the knees absolutely prevents penetration . . . a man
must struggle desperately to penetrate the vagina of a vigorous, virtue-protecting
girl.’” Sarah Begley, “Redefining Rape”: A Brief History of Rape in America, THE
DAILY BEAST (Aug. 22, 2013, 4:45 AM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/witw/articles/2013/08/22/redefining-rape-tackles-thethe-rape-of-citizenship.html; see also Berger, supra note 7, at 2-3.
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III. THE IMPACT OF MEDICAL UNDERSTANDING OF WOMEN’S HEALTH
ON THE FIRST WOMEN LAWYERS
A. Experiences of Women Lawyers: Why Medicine and History
Matter
This paper examines in detail an important aspect of how
women have historically interacted with the legal system: experiences
of early women lawyers. This is one of the limited areas where early
women had any interaction with the legal system. However, a
question arises: why examine the experiences of early women
lawyers?
The ways in which the medical community understood gender
impacted early women lawyers in three ways: first, it shaped how they
viewed themselves and may have placed limitations on themselves;
second, it shaped how society viewed them and placed societal
limitations on them; and third, it shaped how the court viewed them
and placed legal limitations on them.27 This complex influence of
medical understandings about gender, then, potentially placed a threefold barrier to women’s progress as lawyers. There are those that may
argue that historical theories about gender based on medical
understanding may be a moot point in terms of scholarship on women
in the law due to the progress women (and the medical community)
have made in modern society.28 However, it is worth discussion and
exploration. First, language mirroring and adopting medically-rooted
biases about gender has been explicitly adopted into some of our early
common law. Second, despite significant progress by women in the
legal profession, women today still have not reached parity with men
in the practice of law.
Women are not progressing in the ranks of the legal profession
at near the rate at which they saturate the legal market.29 The numbers

27

See, e.g., In re Strittmater’s Estate, 53 A.2d at 205-06 (finding a female decedent
who tried to leave her estate to the National Women’s Party to have suffered from
paranoia and man-hating).
28
See Riska, supra note 10, at 82 (explaining that in contemporary society, both men
and women are targeted in the medicalization of gender and noting that some argue
that the targeting is “symmetr[ical]”).
29
In 2011, women comprised 47.3% of those awarded with Juris Doctorates. A.B.A.
COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, A CURRENT GLANCE AT WOMEN IN THE
LAW 4 (2013), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/marketing/women/current_glance_stati
stics_feb2013.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter A CURRENT GLANCE] (citing A.B.A.
SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, J.D. AND LL.B. DEGREES
AWARDED, available at
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of women in leadership positions (or even in the pipeline to obtain
leadership positions) within the legal profession are abysmal, and,
even worse, are stagnant. As of 2012, 96% of managing partners in
the nation’s largest law firms were men.30 Only 15% of equity
partners and 26% of non-equity partners were women.31 Further,
women constituted “only 20% of the members of a typical firm’s
highest governing committee.”32 Even in law schools, only 20.6% of
law school deans were women,33 and women made up less than 30%
of tenured law professors.34 These numbers have not significantly
progressed in the past ten years but, instead, have virtually reached a
plateau.35
Amongst scholars, it is agreed that simply waiting for gender
balance to come into the law is not sufficient.36 Therefore, much
research has been done to delve into the potentially unseen forces
holding women back from professional progress.37 Researchers have

www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissi
ons_to_the_bar/statistics/jd_llb_degrees_awarded.pdf).
30
BARBARA M. FLOMM, NAT’L ASS’N OF WOMEN LAWYERS, REPORT OF THE
SEVENTH ANNUAL NAWL NATIONAL SURVEY ON RETENTION AND PROMOTION OF
WOMEN IN LAW FIRMS 5 (2012), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/women/nawl_2012_sur
vey_report_final.authcheckdam.pdf.
31
Id. at 10-11.
32
Id. at 14.
33
A CURRENT GLANCE, supra note 29, at 4.
34
AM. BAR FOUND., AFTER TENURE: POST-TENURE LAW PROFESSORS IN THE
UNITED STATES 14 (2011), available at
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/after_tenure_report_final-_abf_4.1.pdf.
35
See Hannah Brenner & Renee Newman Knake, Rethinking Gender Equality in the
Legal Profession’s Pipeline to Power: A Study on Media Coverage of Supreme
Court Nominees (Phase I, The Introduction Week), 84 TEMPLE L. REV. 325, 326-27,
335 (2012). Compare A.B.A. COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, A CURRENT
GLANCE AT WOMEN IN THE LAW (2014), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/marketing/women/current_glance_stati
stics_july2014.authcheckdam.pdf, with A.B.A. COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE
PROFESSION, A CURRENT GLANCE AT WOMEN IN THE LAW (2005), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/women/reports/ataglance.aut
hcheckdam.pdf.
36
For instance, if the current trend continues, it will be 212 years before women
achieve gender parity on British boards. Lynn Martin, Gender Parity on Company
Boards—A 212 Year Wait, THE GUARDIAN UK (April 29, 2013, 2:30 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/women-in-leadership/2013/apr/29/gender-parity-212year-wait.
37
See KARIN KLENKE, WOMEN AND LEADERSHIP: A CONTEXTUAL PERSPECTIVE 162
(1996) (noting that “[w]omen construct their leadership style based on different
personal, social, and organizational experiences, in part because they lack realistic
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attempted to explain why women in leadership have reached such
stagnant low numbers. The “unique pressures placed on female
leaders derive in part from the relation between stereotypes about
leaders and stereotypes about women and men.”38 “[D]espite the clear
evidence that male and female leaders are similar in many personality
traits and job-related behaviors,” gender stereotypes continue to
persist, and women do not hold significant leadership positions.39
Some theories suggest that women encounter societal “double binds”
that express themselves in the workplace and make it too difficult for
women to attain and keep leadership positions.40 Double-binds are
often called “catch-22[s]”41 or “no-win situations,”42 and refer to
situations where women face societal pressure and hardship for
choosing either of the two paths before them.43

role models”); DEBORAH L. RHODE & AMANDA K. PACKEL, LEADERSHIP: LAW,
POLICY, AND MANAGEMENT (2011); THE WHITE HOUSE PROJECT REPORT:
BENCHMARKING WOMEN’S LEADERSHIP 3 (2009) (illustrating that “while women
may be participating in the workforce in equal . . . numbers relative to their male
peers, they rarely make it to the top”).
38
Linda L. Carli & Alice H. Eagly, Overcoming Resistance to Women Leaders: The
Importance of Leadership Style, in WOMEN & LEADERSHIP: THE STATE OF PLAY AND
STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE 127, 127 (Barbara Kellerman & Deborah L. Rhode eds.,
2007).
39
KLENKE, supra note 37, at 162. One explanation for the discrepancy between
research on gendered leadership traits and leadership in practice, when women get to
leadership positions, may be that the research itself is flawed. Undergraduate
students are often the choice “subjects to study gender differences in leadership [,
which] may result in [an] inadvertent overrepresentation of the differences between
men and women . . . . [Where] practicing leaders often indicate that there are no
differences between male and female leadership styles, students hold the opposite to
be true.” Id. at 150. Studies suggest that young adulthood appears to be the age
when differences between the sexes are maximized. Id.
40
KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, BEYOND THE DOUBLE BIND: WOMEN AND
LEADERSHIP 120 (1995).
41
Id. at 122.
42
Id. at 17.
43
There are specific constructs underlying the double-binds, including “[t]he nochoice-choice; the self-fulfilling prophecy; the no-win situation; the unrealizable
expectation[;] and the double standard. Each circumscribes choice.” Id. at 17. A
no-choice-choice “casts the world as either/or, with one option set as desirable, the
other loathsome.” Id. A self-fulfilling prophecy is “a false definition of the situation
evoking a new behavior which makes the originally false conception come true.” Id.
(quoting Robert K. Merton, The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 8 ANTIOCH REV. 193,
195). A no-win situation is where “by winning, you lose”—for example, “women
are judged against a masculine standard, and by that standard they lose, whether they
claim difference or similarity.” Id. at 18. “Unrealizable expectations are a corollary
of the no-win situation.” Id. Finally, the double standard is a standard in which
women’s actions are treated differently and judged differently for a longer period of
time. Id.
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I posit that these stereotypes and double binds may have a root
in the same medicalization of gender that early women lawyers
identified as a barrier to their progress. While much research has been
accomplished to identify the double binds that may influence women
in the legal profession, not much is known about where and how these
double binds originated. If, in fact, they are rooted in science and
medicine, the double binds may be even harder to break down and
overcome, as they may have the weight of science and data behind
them. This may explain why double binds still persist in society today,
and acknowledging or identifying a source of origin may help combat
their impact.
Some double binds that have impacted women’s attempts to
practice law are the societal assumptions (often incorporated into
women’s thinking) that:
•
•
•
•

Women can exercise their wombs or their brains,
but not both.
Women who speak out are immodest and will be
shamed, while women who are silent will be
ignored or dismissed.
Women are subordinate whether they claim to be
different from men or the same.
Women who are considered feminine will be judged
incompetent, and women who are competent,
unfeminine.44

One example that has been flagged by the American Bar Association’s
Commission on Women in the Profession is that “women walk a fine
line between being regarded as too feminine (and thus not tough,
lawyer-like, or smart) or too tough (and thus unfeminine or not the
kind of women male colleagues feel comfortable relating to).”45
Further, women who do reach higher leadership levels are “scrutinized
under a different lens [than] that [which is] applied to successful men,
and for longer periods of time.”46 For example, unlike male leaders,
every decision a female leader makes is analyzed in the context of her
gender, and her successes are often attributed to luck or written off as
flukes.47 These double binds, once examined, reflect some of the same

44

Id. at 16.
Id. at 121.
46
Id. at 16.
47
Rosalind Chait Barnett, Women, Leadership, and the Natural Order, in WOMEN &
LEADERSHIP: THE STATE OF PLAY AND STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE 149, 156-58
(Barbara Kellerman & Deborah L. Rhode eds., 2007).
45
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presumptions about gender that the medical community attempted to
diagnose and treat.48 For example, the double bind that women can
exercise their wombs or their brains (but not both) seems to directly
stem from Edward Clarke’s antiquated and unfounded assumptions
about gender in 1873.49
Another theory argues that traditional leadership models in the
professional world value historically “masculine” attributes over
historically “feminine” attributes.50 These traditional leadership
models promote traditionally-identified masculine attributes, such as
being aggressive, ambitious, and analytical or possessing traits like
self-sufficiency and dominance, instead of feminine attributes, such as
being affectionate, cheerful, and childlike or possessing traits like
kindness, helpfulness, and gentleness.51 The danger with these
stereotypes is that they are not only descriptive, but also proscriptive,
meaning that people not only expect women to be kind and gentle, but
also prefer women to behave in such ways.52 A further result is that
“women themselves reported that they were less inclined to see
themselves as leaders or seek leadership roles.”53

When women succeed, they are viewed as having some special stroke of
good fortune—a wonderful mentor, a luck break, being at the right place at
the right time. Their success is treated as happenstance, an outcome over
which they had no particular control. Not surprisingly, research shows that
when women succeed, they rarely get credit for their success.
Id. (citing Madeline E. Heilman & Michelle C. Haynes, No Credit Where Credit Is
Due: Attributional Rationalization of Women’s Success in Male-Female Teams, 90 J.
APPLIED PSYCH. 905 (2005)).
48
See supra Part II.
49
See discussion supra note 8. In 1873, Clarke published Sex in Education; or a
Fair Chance for the Girls, in which he argued that women should not be allowed to
educate themselves for the good of society because to so tax the brain by learning
would directly impact the reproductive organs negatively, thus endangering women’s
chances of successfully reproducing and expanding society. CLARKE, supra note 8,
at 42.
50
JAMIESON, supra note 40, at 124. The widely credited study recognizing these
gendered characteristics and their contribution to leadership ideals appears to be
written by Paul Rosenkrantz, Susan Vogel, and others. See Paul Rosenkrantz et al.,
Sex-Role Stereotypes and Self-Concepts in College Students, 32 J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCH. 287 (1968) (discussing the relationship of self-concept to
differentially valued sex-role stereotypes). For a discussion on modern comparative
associations between gender and leaders, see Sabine Sczesny et al., Gender
Stereotypes and the Attribution of Leadership Traits: A Cross-Cultural Comparison,
51 SEX ROLES 631, 642-43 (2004) (discussing different leadership stereotypes).
51
Carli & Eagly, supra note 38, at 127; JAMIESON, supra note 40, at 124.
52
Carli & Eagly, supra note 38, at 128.
53
KLENKE, supra note 37, at 166.

2015]

MEDICALIZING GENDER

45

Studies have found that “dividing human characteristics along
gender lines is also likely to increase the attention we pay to particular
behaviors displayed by men and women, as well as the possibility of
exaggerated selective judgments.”54 So, even when an attribute was
present in both men and women, if it was dichotomized along gender
lines, observers were more likely to look for and note those behaviors
in only one gender.55 The dichotomization of leadership styles is
similarly split by expected gender lines.56 This is recognized as
another double bind—women are not only expected to exhibit
attributes that are social- and service-oriented (communal) to be a
successful woman, but are also expected to exhibit the attributes that
are achievement-oriented (agentic) to be a successful leader.57 If
women are not bringing in business or racking up billable hours in the
legal profession, they are seen as lacking the skills required to be
leaders. However, if women attempt to achieve these goals using the
same methods as their male colleagues, they are similarly disdained
and face professional disapproval.58 Finally, situational factors, such

54

Id. at 144.
Id.
56
Some studies have even defined leadership styles as “acting like a man versus
acting like a woman.” Id. at 146.
57
Madeline E. Heilman, Description and Prescription: How Gender Stereotypes
Prevent Women’s Ascent Up the Organizational Ladder, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 657, 658
(2001); Carli & Eagly, supra note 38, at 128 (citing Virginia E. Schein, A Global
Look at Psychological Barriers to Women’s Progress in Management, 57 J. SOC.
ISSUES 675-88 (2001)).
Looking at the international managerial stereotype items illustrates rather
dramatically the unfavorable way in which women are viewed, especially
among males. Male management students in five different countries and
male corporate managers in the United States view women as much less
likely to have leadership ability, be competitive, ambitious, or skilled in
business matters, have analytical ability, or desire responsibility.
Schein, supra at 683.
58
A Supreme Court case involving discrimination on this exact topic involved an
accounting firm and Ann Hopkins, a female senior manager who was denied a
partnership. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). She had
“played a key role” in negotiating a $25 million contract and was praised for her
work, which was recognized to be “virtually at a partner level.” Id. at 233-34. Yet
she was denied partnership because the firm claimed that she had problems with
“inter-personal skills,” was “macho,” and “overcompensated for being a woman.”
Id. at 234-35. This case was remanded because the lower courts had used the
incorrect evidentiary standard. Id. at 258. On remand, the district court found that
the employer was liable and that the proper remedy was an order declaring that
Hopkins be made a partner and paid over $300,000 in backpay. Hopkins v. Price
Waterhouse, 737 F. Supp. 1202, 1216-17 (D.D.C. 1990). The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 920 F.2d 967, 970 (D.C. Cir.
55
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as expectations about gender roles regarding women and parenting;59
career/family conflict;60 and the types of law deemed “acceptable”

1990). Price Waterhouse is indicative of how the professional world reacts to
women attempting to fit a male stereotype of leadership.
59
Women are often perceived as lacking aspirations to reach leadership levels
compared to men, and this is often cited as the reason women “opt-out” of
promotions or leave work when they get pregnant. Barnett, supra note 47, at 155-57.
In fact, data from representative samples show that women are not opting out based
on a desire to be at home, but in fact “intend to work and have families,” and that
“their career ambitions mirror those of their male counterparts.” Id. at 156. In
reality, the reason that women left work upon becoming a mother is that they were
being “pushed out” of work. Id. at 155.
60
Along these same lines, even if a law firm does have a “family friendly” policy
permitting part-time schedules, lawyers are reluctant to take advantage because of
fear of professional repercussions. A.B.A. COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION,
CHARTING OUR PROGRESS: THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION TODAY 6
(2006), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/women/ChartingOurProgress
.authcheckdam.pdf. [hereinafter CHARTING OUR PROGRESS]. This problem is even
worse for women of color. “An African-American lawyer noted that women of color
who are the first women in their families to become college graduates or
professionals often lack the social and professional contacts needed to develop a
client base.” Id. at 6. These “[m]ultiple and often competing demands from major
life roles almost invariably create conflict and stress,” and career-family conflict is a
common occurrence for women. KLENKE, supra note 37, at 179. Compounding this
fact is that, if a woman does decide to stay in the work force, she essentially has a
second job at home. Id. The reality is that, despite evidence of men participating
more in household tasks, “sex-role distinctions [still] persist when it comes to the
division of labor at home, with women continuing to handle the lion’s share of
domestic and childrearing obligations.” Id. Thus, if women decide to stay in the
work force, they face conflict between their societal and career demands. In the
workplace, women lawyers are judged as insufficiently aggressive, too emotional,
and not as serious about their careers as men, and when they do choose (or are
pushed) to “opt for family leave or report sexual harassment, these stereotypes are
reinforced.” CHARTING OUR PROGRESS, supra at 5 (quoting A.B.A. COMM’N ON
WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: OVERCOMING THE SISYPHUS
FACTOR 13 (1995), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/women/publications/unfinish
edbusiness.authcheckdam.pdf). On top of these pressures, of the women who do
reach leadership positions, their successes are rarely given credit in the news while
their failures are immediately credited to an inability to balance “work and family,”
an allegation that is not similarly thrown at men for their similar failures. Barnett,
supra note 47, at 156-57. “[W]hen Brenda Barnes resigned from a high-level
position at PepsiCo, a media feeding frenzy ensued, full of stories saying that she,
and by extension other women, couldn’t handle work and family.” Id. at 156. Sara
Lee Corporation subsequently hired Barnes as president, and she now heads a
corporation that has operations in fifty-eight countries and employees of 137,000
people worldwide, but the media did not report her work in this position. Id.
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based on gender,61 all similarly impact women’s successes in the legal
profession, and all are similarly impacted by gendered assumptions
stemming from the medical community. So it is not necessarily
women’s natural inclinations or a pull to the home that takes women
out of the running for leadership, it is instead the stereotype of the
“natural order” that pervades the occupation and dictates who leads
and who follows.62 By citing the “natural order,” these stereotypes
seem to stem from medicine’s understanding of biology and gender.
While much research has been put forth on the barriers to
women’s progress in the medical and legal fields, one area that has not
been fully delved into in either arena is the interaction between science
and medical understandings and their incorporation into the legal
system. Further, the extent to which the medical view of gender may
have shaped these double binds has not been examined. Only by
exposing every barrier that early women lawyers encountered may
scholars illuminate the discussion of the struggles modern women
lawyers face today.

61

This has a component that is influenced by scientific and medical understandings
about gender as well. Within the legal profession, certain types of law are seen as
more acceptable based on gender. For example, women have historically been more
societally accepted in family law, as it is seen as a natural extension of their societal
role as a woman and mother. The history of women in law supports that women
were pushed into family law.
As women began to practice law, many were steered into areas where the
practice fit the image of a woman lawyer. One of the areas where women
were seen as a good fit by the legal gatekeepers was family law, with almost
half of all women lawyers practicing some family law in 1967. Male
attorneys viewed family law as a less than ideal practice area because so
much of the practice involves interpersonal issues rather than strictly legal
issues. Family law is also considered a lesser field because it is associated
with a smaller income.
Sheila Simon, Jazz and Family Law: Structures, Freedoms, and Sound Changes, 42
IND. L. REV. 567, 579 (2009) (footnotes omitted) (citing CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN,
WOMEN-IN LAW 102-03, 111 (1983)). Unfortunately, the author notes that
“[s]teering women into family law continues. In a 2004 American Bar Association
publication on women in law, in a section on career choices, [it states:] ‘[F]ields
involving representation of women and children, like family law, have been
considered naturally suited to women lawyers.’” Simon, supra at 579.
62
Barnett argues that the underlying reason why leadership is so gendered is that
there is “an unspoken but firmly held belief that there is natural order in which males
are innately and uniquely endowed to take charge, whereas females are innately and
unique endowed to take care.” Barnett, supra note 47, at 151. In this scenario, men
are naturally equipped to lead while women are naturally equipped to follow. She
argues that the belief in the natural order “permeates our thinking, our expectations,
our perceptions of the world, and our pedagogy.” Id. at 151-53.
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As discussed above, medical understandings carry with them
the weight of expertise, experimentation, and raw data, which–in
practice–afford them great weight.63 Arguably, the weight they carry
is doubled if they are adopted into common law parlance by the courts,
because then they have the weight of the law as well as of science
behind them. If subtle (or not so subtle) biases existed in medical
diagnoses or assumptions about gender, they may have subconsciously
shaped expectations about women in society and in the law. Pulling
apart medical authority on gender shows that these understandings,
under the weight of medical and scientific authority, did in fact hold
women back, relegating them to their traditional gender roles and
keeping them out of the legal profession.64 I refer to this as
“medicalizing gender,”65 borrowing from the sociologists who coined
the idea of “medicalization” in the 1950s.66
[M]edicalization is primarily a matter of defining
already-problematic behaviors in medical terms [and]
consists of defining a problem in medical terms, using
medical language to describe a problem, adopting a
medical framework to understand a problem, or using a
medical intervention to ‘treat’ it. Medicalization occurs
when a medical frame or definition has been applied in
an attempt to understand or manage a problem.67
Each part of this definition has been applied to women based
on their gender. Any behavior that would increase their position in
society, such as seeking an education, pursuing a profession, or acting
in a way that would eschew traditional sexual, gender, or family roles,
was immediately branded as an illness and relegated to the medical
community.68 Thus, it was medicalized. The crux of the discussion,
however, is examining how this medicalization actually functioned to

63

See supra Part II.
Riska, supra note 10, at 82.
65
In my discussion, I refer to “medicalizing gender” as the attribution of biological
inferiorities as intrinsic to the female gender by the medical community, and how it
subjugated early women lawyers.
66
The power of medicine to define and regulate social action was introduced
by Talcott Parsons, who, in 1951, wrote about medicine’s role in controlling
deviance and, in the process (in true functionalist fashion), reproducing and
strengthening the social order by holding the sick accountable to dominant
social norms of productivity—a function that was beneficial to all.
MEDICALIZED MASCULINITIES, supra note 10, at 2; see also PARSONS, supra note 10.
67
MEDICALIZED MASCULINITIES, supra note 10, at 3.
68
Riska, supra note 10, at 82.
64
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hold back women as lawyers. I break the discussion down into three
parts: how women implemented this medicalization of their gender by
self-diagnosing and limiting their own progress as lawyers; how
society implemented this medicalization and limited women lawyers
through expectations of societal “spheres”; and, finally, how courts
incorporated medicalization into laws and placed legal barriers on
women’s progress as lawyers.
IV. THE IMPACT: INTERNALIZED VERSUS EXTERNALIZED ADOPTION OF
MEDICAL THEORIES ABOUT GENDER
A. Symptoms, Diagnoses, and Treatments: Shaping the Discussion of
How Women Viewed Themselves
In order to facilitate a discussion of how these medical theories
shaped societal views on gender in the context of women entering the
legal profession, it is necessary to split the discussion into three parts.
First, I explore how early women lawyers in the United States
interacted with these medical theories and studies. Only by examining
to what extent early women lawyers were aware of and accepted these
theories can we explore how they may have been held back by them.
This includes a discussion on self-diagnosis based on medical theories.
By understanding, at a threshold level, the limits that these early
women lawyers placed on themselves, we can, in turn, understand
barriers to their progress.
Second, I explore how medical
understanding progressed through the 1900s, including how
pervasively medical theories invaded society as a whole. Here, a
discussion of which medical specialties were considered experts in
“female illnesses” illuminates how “female illnesses” were, in turn,
viewed by members of society. This also requires a discussion of
treatments. Treatments for these “female illnesses” strongly reflected
a desire to return women to their “proper” roles in society to “cure”
them.69 Finally, I will explore as to how medical theories on gender
were incorporated into the U.S. legal system in the context of the first
women lawyers. Here, I examine the language used in court cases—
and, thus, adopted as part of U.S. common law—and explore how
much of that language is shaped by medical understanding.

69

Id. (noting that “the medicalization thesis has served as a heuristic device … to
reinforce women’s traditional sex role”).
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B. Symptoms: Self-Diagnosing
The issue of women’s health and sexuality was one that, much
like today, was at the forefront of the minds of early women lawyers.70
“[The] debate about women’s physiological ability to endure the
strains of law practice occurred within the context of the larger social
debate about the fragility of women’s health.”71
A desire to maintain traditional gender roles within the family
and, thus, societal stability, along with a desire to maintain the status
quo, often worked in conjunction with medical understanding and
medical theories to continue to influence how society viewed women.
The types of symptoms that were characteristic of nineteenth-century
women’s nervous and mental illnesses reflect the desire to maintain
the norm.72 As discussed previously, disease is a social construct, and
defining symptoms is part of defining disease.73 While the symptoms
for “female illnesses” were numerous and varied, it is clear that “the
common characteristic of the symptoms was the unfeminine nature of
the behavior or feeling.”74 “Insane and nervous women were
described as antimaternal, selfish, willful, violent, erotic—all of these
inappropriate in terms of nineteenth-century definitions of
womanhood.”75 Describing these symptoms in the same terms as the
societal understanding of the proper role and “sphere” of women made
it near impossible for any who opposed them to challenge them
without threatening to strike at the foundations of society.
Clearly, the power of medicine was significant in defining and
treating these illnesses. The medicalization thesis posits that the
medical profession has great power “as a culture and as a profession—
to define and regulate social behavior.”76 Eventually, an important
shift occurred in how society addressed women’s behaviors that did
not meet social norms (i.e., “deviant” behavior).77 The shift was one
that took this deviant behavior out of the moral or religious realm for

70

Drachman, supra note 1, at 31.
Id.
72
Riska, supra note 10, at 66-67 (stating that “gender-biased medical knowledge and
diagnoses and treatments . . . resulted in . . . overuse of drugs” and surgeries, such as
hysterectomies); see also Theriot, supra note 9, at 17 (stating that “symptoms of
insanity vary depending on time and place and that attaching names to peculiar
behavior can be seen as the medical community’s medicalization and labeling of
inappropriate behavior as disease”).
73
Id. at 3.
74
Id. at 17.
75
Id.
76
Riska, supra note 10, at 59.
77
PARSONS, supra note 10, at 320-21.
71
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“treatment” and into one that was medical and scientific.78 “The agent
of social control was the medical profession, an institutionalized
structure in society that had been given the mandate to restore the
health of the sick so that they could resume their expected role
obligations.”79
In her chronicle about the struggle of early female lawyers in
the United States, Drachman writes:
Prevailing medical wisdom defined women as
physiologically unsuited to undertake rigorous mental
work after the onset of puberty. The physician most
responsible for popularizing this view was Edward H.
Clarke, a professor at Harvard Medical College. In
1873, he published Sex in Education; or, a Fair Chance
for the Girls, which explained the supposed weakness
of female physiology to the general reader. Wrapped in
the banner of medical authority, Sex in Education was
an assault on the new phenomenon of coeducation.
Clarke warned that women’s reproductive physiology
made it unsafe for them to undertake any intellectual
activity with the same rigor as men. Excessive study,
he explained, diverted energy from the female
reproductive organs to the brain, causing a breakdown
in women’s health and threatening the health of future
generations.80
This study was widely read (and widely criticized),81 including
by the members of the Equity Club, an early organization that brought
78

Viewed within this frame, diagnoses (and diagnostic categories) are not
neutral ‘discoveries’ so much as highly subjective interpretations, and a
number of studies published in the 1970s and 1980s . . . traced the shift in
interpretation of deviant behavior from moral to medical deficit, or ‘badness
to sickness’ (nested in the secularization and rationalization of Western
society. . .).
MEDICALIZED MASCULINITIES, supra note 10, at 3.
79
Riska, supra note 10, at 59.
80
Drachman, supra note 1, at 31; see also CLARKE, supra note 8, at 12 (“The
problem of woman’s sphere, to use the modern phrase, is not to be solved by
applying it to abstract principles of right and wrong. Its solution must be obtained
from physiology.”) “[I]t is not true that she can [go to school and pursue studies]
and retain uninjured health and a future secure from neuralgia, uterine disease,
hysteria, and other derangements of the nervous system, if she follows the same
method that boys are trained in.” Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added).
81
“Sex in Education reached beyond the boundaries of the elite women’s colleges in
the Northeast to large public universities such as the University of Michigan. The
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together the first female lawyers across the globe through letter
correspondence.82 Ellen Martin, one of the early members, wrote that
she felt she was being held back by biological factors, which sparked a
debate amongst the women on the issue of women’s health.83
However, “[f]rom their letters, it was clear that Martin’s views were in
a distinct minority.”84
In fact, “[t]he Equity Club members
overwhelmingly agreed . . . that it was the material conditions of
women’s lives, rather than a weakness inherent to women’s
reproductive physiology, that was responsible for their physical
problems.”85
However, knowledge of these symptoms and of Clarke’s
theories was so pervasive that these women would both self-diagnose
and be diagnosed by those around them.86 Women would often seek
to have themselves committed when they recognized in themselves
feelings like “lack of interest in husband or family, violent feelings
toward their children, and continual sadness or suicidal urges in spite
of being well taken care of by husband or family.”87 What served as
evidence of mental illness were actually behavior problems that
threatened the status quo’s accepted definition of feminine propriety.88
These “symptoms” were then medicalized into the discourse and
definition of female illnesses by the medical community, as well as by
women themselves.
This meant that, in terms of medical treatment, doctors:
treated nervous and insane women as if their female
bodies were defective. The most dramatic examples of
this treatment philosophy were “local” treatments and
sexual surgery. If the symptoms of nervous and mental

local bookseller in Ann Arbor sold over 200 copies of the book in a single day.”
Drachman, supra note 1, at 32. “The president and the faculty read it, and shook
their heads doubtfully about the ‘experiment in coeducation.’” Id. (quoting OLIVE
SAN LOUIE ANDERSON, AN AMERICAN GIRL AND HER FOUR YEARS IN A BOYS’
COLLEGE 96 (1878)); see Drachman, supra note 1, at 31-32 n.62 (listing works
challenging Clarke in the years immediately after he published his study).
82
The Equity Club allowed the first women lawyers both in the United States and
even in Europe a discourse to discuss problems they encountered in attempting to
practice law. Women’s health was at the forefront of many of these letters. See
Drachman, supra note 1.
83
Id. at 33.
84
Id. at 34.
85
Id.
86
Theriot, supra note 9, at 18.
87
Id. at 17.
88
Id. at 18.
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illness were unwomanly behavior and feelings, and if
the causes were rooted in the female body, then the
cures must produce some change in the woman
patient’s reproductive organs to change the woman’s
behavior.89
Women themselves often were the ones who asked for this type of
surgery or went into it under the urging of family and friends.90
The role of female patients in self-diagnosing, thus, was
important in perpetuating the cycle of gendered diagnoses relegating
women to their traditional roles.91 Even if not explicitly turning
themselves over to doctors at the first signs of unwomanly behavior,
women likely suppressed these “unfeminine” thoughts and urges due
to the knowledge of what was expected of them and due to a fear of
failing at their medically and socially-proscribed gender role.92 The
danger of using medical evidence in the courts at this time was that
“[t]he nervous symptoms and deviant behavior of the nineteenthcentury women patients were shaped by the constraints of gender and
then were medicalized and therefore legitimized by medical
representation as disease.”93
Holding a different view or questioning the medical wisdom
challenged an understanding about gender that was at the foundation
of how society was structured. That understanding, in essence, ties
into the theories of “natural law,” the very foundation of our society.94
Natural law, it seems, further reiterated the concept of “separate
spheres” based on gender that the court would eventually cite to keep
women from practicing law.95

89

Id. at 21.
Id. at 20-21.
91
“A reproductive theory of women’s insanity and nervous disease dominated the
nineteenth century partially because women experienced their reproductive lives as
troublesome.” Id. at 24.
92
Id. at 17.
93
Id.
94
Natural law was cited by those who formed the very legal system after which the
U.S. legal system was modeled. “Treating the law of nature as a source of English
law was strictly conventional, and the discussion bespoke Blackstone’s concern to
furnish England’s law with the appropriate philosophical apparatus, which in this
setting demanded a discussion of ‘what we call ethics or natural law.’” David
Lieberman, Blackstone's Science of Legislation, 98/99 LAW & JUST. CHRISTIAN L.
REV. 60, 65 (1988) (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 41 (Joseph Chitty ed., 1826)).
95
“The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine
ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that
90
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An enduring reliance on the “natural” order of the sexes
allows women to be located as “other” and makes the
dominance of men over women “natural.” Men are
historically associated with light, reason, logic, and
urban centers—culture, or the public sphere—while
women are associated with darkness, nature, mothering,
feeling, and superstition—nature, or the private
sphere.96
Many of the first women lawyers broke into the profession
because a family member or husband served as a sort of mentor to give
them confidence as to their abilities, despite what society told them
about their limitations.97 So, even despite these prevalent assumptions
about gender, and even though “Sex in Education carried the weight of
medical theory, the opinions of the Equity Club members grew out of
their personal experiences,” where they found themselves, in practice,
able to withstand and perhaps even thrive on the mental rigor of the
legal practice to the same extent as men.98
Unfortunately, while most women already practicing law
observed the flaws in these medical theories, elsewhere in society
these medical theories were trusted in the debate on women’s health.99
This meant that most women would see their gender as an innate
barrier barring even an attempt to delve into societal “spheres” that
they believed they were ill-equipped for. This, in turn, meant that less
women were willing to enter the legal profession, seeing this medical
authority as a significant deterrent and trusting the expertise of the
respected medical profession.100 Further, as discussed later, the court
could (and would) use medical authority as a legal argument to keep

which properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood.” Bradwell v.
Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872).
96
Lisa McLaughlin, Discourses of Prostitution/Discourses of Sexuality, 8 CRITICAL
STUD. IN MASS COMM. 249, 250 (1991).
97
“Notably, many of the early women lawyers had incredibly supportive husbands
[], some never married [], and some became lawyers because or in spite of abusive
and or cheating husbands they divorced [].” JOANNE BELKNAP, THE INVISIBLE
WOMAN: GENDER, CRIME AND JUSTICE 551 (2014). However, “it was particularly
difficult for married women to become lawyers unless they were married to a lawyer
who was willing to train them.” Id.
98
Drachman, supra note 1, at 34-35.
99
Id. at 31; Theriot, supra note 9, at 20.
100
Id. at 5; see also Drachman, supra note 1, at 33 (recalling that it was once
accepted that a female lawyer’s “proper place was in the office” rather than in the
courtroom).
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women out of the profession and firmly and safely keep them in their
“spheres” using the weight of medical authority.101
C. How Society Viewed Women as a Gender: Volleying Female
Illnesses from Alienist102 to Gynecologist
i.

Female Illness and Behavior as Linked to Reproductive Organs

As discussed above, women both self-diagnosed and were
diagnosed by those around them, including friends and family
members. They were often diagnosed by “[h]usbands [who] brought
in wives for a variety of unwomanly offenses,” including
“[disagreeing] too vocally, [losing] interest in personal appearance, or
[neglecting] their children.”103 There was also a large number of
mothers bringing in daughters who were “insubordinate, sexually
promiscuous, or not interested enough in socializing.”104 The welldefined expectation of a woman’s place in society was part of what
allowed friends and family members to diagnose these women.
Women were expected to be in charge of the home and the family.
Therefore, by defining female illness as one that threatened a woman’s
ability to fulfill her gender role,105 the medical community made
women’s health a societal issue, not a personal health issue.
In order to best understand how the lives of the first female
lawyers were impacted by popular medical understandings about
gender, it is necessary to parse out a brief history of medical
authorities that dealt with “female illnesses,” thereby shaping societal
understanding of gender. Within the medical community, Clarke was
far from alone in his opinion on women’s health. In 1887, an article
referenced the well-known edict that “nearly all of those ills to which
feminine flesh is heir are due either to disorders of the female
reproductive organs, or so influenced by these organs as to constitute a
particular class of diseases.”106 These “ills” stretched beyond actual
pain or sickness in reproductive organs or the rest of the body to
encompass any sort of behavior on the part of women that was seen as

101

See Theriot, supra note 9, at 5 (noting that early gynecologists found female
reproductive organs to be responsible for mental illness in women).
102
“Alienist was an earlier name for psychiatrist.” Id. at 3.
103
Id. at 18.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 17.
106
Id. at 3 (quoting Alice May Farnham, Uterine Diseases as a Factor in the
Production of Insanity, 8 ALIENIST & NEUROLOGIST 532 (1887)).
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unfeminine or any mental disorder that plagued women in the
1800s.107
The discourse of society, then, was shaped by medical
discourse, which was in turn shaped by the time- and place-specific
medical practices, societal norms, and expectations.108 Further, the
different branches of medicine to which “female diseases” were
relegated defined the lens through which female illnesses were
viewed.109 Medical agents expanded the authority of the medical
community “into areas of life previously outside its purview” by
“redefining social problems as medical ones and claiming that their
own expertise was the most appropriate one to cure them.”110 To
reiterate, the very structure of how disease is “created” not only
reflects societal assumptions about gender but can also help reinforce
them. By viewing the societal construct of the female gender as
something that could be “diseased,” it was thus medicalized and
passed into the realms of science and medicine.
The type of doctor to which “female illnesses” were relegated
strongly shaped the discourse on the illnesses. For example,
“[g]ynecologists specialized in the diseases of women, alienists
specialized in mental illness [], and neurologists specialized in diseases
of the nervous system.”111 Gynecologists would thus root “female
illness” to the biological function of reproductive organs, while
alienists and/or neurologists would root “female illness” to the
functions of the female brain. By relegating “female illnesses” that
exhibited mental symptoms primarily to doctors who would look to
reproductive organs for a biological cause, it grounded these diseases

107

See id. at 6 (“[M]en who were in the process of creating a scientific specialty
devoted to unveiling women’s otherness would see all of [women’s] complaints as
rooted in their ovaries and uterus.”); Riska, supra note 10, at 66-67 (stating that
“gender-biased medical knowledge and diagnoses and treatments . . . resulted in . . .
overuse of drugs” and surgeries, such as hysterectomies).
108
Theriot, supra note 9, at 6.
109
Id. at 4. However, Theriot discusses how Farnham went on to present case
studies to illustrate her conclusion that “uterine disease alone is seldom or never the
cause of mental alienation [insanity].” Farnham, supra note 106, at 546.
110
MEDICALIZED MASCULINITIES, supra note 10, at 2-3. One theory posited in the
1970s was that the “increasingly technical and bureaucratic nature of Western
society” was the force behind allowing medicalization of society as a whole. Id. at 3.
By referring to “medicalization of society,” he meant “the exponential labeling of
aspects of everyday life as medical in nature by medical agents.” Id. This may have
stemmed from the professional desire of the medical community to expand their
influence, but was facilitated by “the larger social context’s desire for technical
solutions to social troubles” that “accommodated medicine’s tactics and tendencies.”
Id.
111
Theriot, supra note 9, at 4.
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in the very biological elements that defined womanhood.
If
reproductive systems were seen as the root of illness, and these
symptoms similarly defined a person as a woman, reproductive
systems made femalehood carry a stigma of being diseased.
“According to Farnham, the result of this widespread belief was that
‘the alienist and neurologist beheld his hysterical, melancholic and
maniacal patients torn from his grasp and, by the wave of public
opinion, cast into the hands of his brother practitioner, the
gynaecologist.’”112
In claiming women’s physical and mental illness as
gynecological territory, gynecological medical science
collapsed the distinction between gender and sex . . .
[w]hen applied to women’s mental illness and nervous
complaints, gynecological medicine suggested that
women were mentally ill or nervous simply because
they were female and that their symptoms could be
handled with physiological cures that, to late twentiethcentury readers, appear to range from mildly punitive to
unmistakably sadistic.113
By conflating women’s physical and mental illnesses into having the
same root cause—the reproductive organs—women were set apart
from men, reiterating societal expectations about women’s limitations.
It should be noted that “physicians were less likely to connect men’s
ailments to their genitalia, while assuming that women’s reproductive
organs caused both physical and mental disease.”114 These diagnoses,
in turn, presented a biological barrier innate to a woman’s gender that
would threaten the family and, ultimately, the societal structure as a
whole if a woman were to tax her reproductive organs by seeking an
education or, worse, by delving into the legal profession.

112

Id. at 3 (emphasis added) (citing Farnham, supra note 106, at 532). For more
discussion on insanity in females by the medical community and of theories
analogizing gynecologists’ attempts to medicalize childbirth (to drive out
competition from midwives) and to have a theory of women’s mental illness that
held the gynecologist to be the specialist of choice (to drive out professional
competition in this arena as well), see Theriot, supra note 9.
113
Id. at 6-7 (emphasis added).
114
GRONEMAN, supra note 26, at 4.
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Next Steps: The Speculum and Early 1900s to a Neurological
View

The invention and use of one tool in particular, the speculum,
greatly influenced gynecological perception of women’s illnesses.115
“This new tool encouraged an anatomical representation of women’s
complaints partially because previously invisible problems, some
serious and some benign, suddenly became viewable.”116 It does make
sense that gynecology, a specialty that centered around the “otherness”
and “essential femaleness” of a woman, would see all women’s
complaints as rooted in their ovaries and uterus.117 The relevance of
whether women’s illnesses were relegated to the gynecological or
neurological specialties is important because “[w]hile the
gynecological view of women’s problems was based on the
reproductive organs—and therefore open to clinical refutation—the
neurological/psychiatric view was based on the invisible femininity of
the nervous system—and therefore closed to clinical refutation.”118
The changes in what branch of the medical community qualified as
“experts” in female illnesses show that a “cure” for women, who
seemed to stray outside of their societal sphere, was at the forefront of
concern for society in the late 1800s and early 1900s.119
Eventually, the understanding of the medical community
slowly came back to focus on a neurological view, partly due to the
role of females in the medical profession.120 Women physicians
accepted that the mind and organs interacted, but often made less farsweeping conclusions about the link or were less likely to believe the
theory of cause and effect than gynecologists, especially after
conducting clinical trials and studying patients.121 However, these
115

Theriot, supra note 9, at 6.
Id. (citing Ornella Moscucci, THE SCIENCE OF WOMAN: GYNAECOLOGY AND
GENDER IN ENGLAND, 1800-1929 (1990)).
117
Id.
118
Id. at 10 (“Illustrations of the nervous system in the nineteenth century were of
female bodies, whereas illustrations of the muscular system were of male bodies.
Nerves were inherently feminine, and women were inherently prone to nervousness
and to manic, depressive, or hysterical responses to life’s difficulties.”).
119
See generally id. at 4-10 (discussing how different theories of female illnesses
competed against each other).
120
Id. at 10 (illustrating that “[t]he contribution of women physicians to the
professional discourse on women’s insanity and nervousness formed part of the
neurological and psychiatric case against gynecological thinking, although most
women physicians who participated in the discourse were technically gynecologists
(i.e., most treated the diseases of women).”
121
Id. at 12. “Medical women consistently supported the neurological and
psychiatric position against the gynecological essentialism that tied women’s
116
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views were not adopted by the majority of medical professionals or the
courts, despite being supported by clinical trials and empirical
evidence that conferred to the medical profession an air of authority.122
Importantly, across medical specialties, the “nineteenth-century
physicians, no matter what their specialty, assumed that women and
men were more different than alike and that the physiological
differences between the sexes translated ‘naturally’ to different social
roles.”123 This widespread understanding by the medical community
as a whole was clearly one that, as discussed later, courts eventually
drew on in denying women the right to practice law.
iii.

Treatments that Solidified Gender Roles: From Staying in Your
Sphere to Surgery

The treatments prescribed to women in the late 1800s further
reflected the medical and societal bases underlying female diseases.
These treatments influenced society to keep women out of the legal
profession. In 1890, Charlotte Perkins Gilman turned to Dr. S. Weir
Mitchell when she was treated for neurasthenia124 after the birth of her
daughter, and was prescribed his famous “rest cure.”125 This
prescription, after a month of bed-rest, required her to “[l]ive as
domestic a life as possible. Have your child with you all the time . . . .
Lie down an hour after each meal. Have but two hours’ intellectual
life a day. And never touch a pen, brush, or pencil as long as you
live.”126 Nervous conditions were linked with women’s ambitions; it

nervous and mental illness to their reproductive organs.” Id. These medical women,
as Theriot discusses, often treated women who would have been “doomed [] to the
knife” if they had gone to male physicians, whom they viewed as “young and
thoughtless operators, aided if not by greed of gold, with errors in diagnosis.” Id.
122
Id. at 13.
123
Id. at 9.
124
Neurasthenia denotes “a mental disorder marked by chronic weakness and easy
fatigability.” Neurasthenia Definition, DORLAND’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY FOR
HEALTH CONSUMERS, http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/neurasthenia
(last visited Apr. 18, 2015).
125
HUBERT, supra note 23, at 63. The rest cure “was consistent with the prevailing
opinion of the time, which conceptualized mental disease as an organic condition
that could be exacerbated by environmental stress. [The doctor’s] treatment of
Gilman also reflects sex role expectations and the belief that intellectual work was
harmful to women.” Id.
126
Id. In citing Gilman’s autobiography, Hubert notes that this rest cure “only made
Gilman’s condition worse” and led Gilman closer to losing her mind. Id. (citing
CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN, THE LIVING OF CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN 96, 121
(1935)). Gilman’s condition was alleviated by being away from home, so she
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was believed that mental breakdown occurred when women “defied
their ‘nature,’ attempted to compete with men instead of serving them,
or sought alternatives or even additions to their maternal functions.”127
“[M]ost alienists and neurologists agreed with their
gynecologist colleagues that women's reproductive organs dictated that
women should restrict their activities and aspirations.”128 For women
seeking to enter the legal profession, this posed an immense barrier.
“Because their interests lay outside the recognized sphere of a
woman’s world they received little support and often little sympathy
from their physicians, their society, and sometimes even their own
family. These women had to define themselves to themselves, often in
defiance of all authority figures around them.”129 Thus, the obstacles
that existed for women looking to break from the medically-defined
“spheres” existed in the diagnoses of symptoms as well as the
treatments prescribed for them.
Another treatment option available for women beyond the rest
cure was surgery. “Operations were performed on both sides of the
Atlantic for nymphomania, hysteria, dysmenorrhea (painful
menstruation), epilepsy, ovarian insanity, and all manner of ill-defined
female diseases.”130 Women physicians, besides questioning the
assumed link between mind and reproductive systems, often opposed
the extreme surgical measures that were taken to “cure” women of the
diseases that were diagnosed as stemming from their reproductive
systems.131 For example, one oft-used cure called for the “removal of
the ovaries from the pelvis” under the assumption that doing so
“removes them from the head.”132 Women physicians who found little
correlation between mental disease and reproductive symptoms in their
case studies saw that this surgery did not address the cause of female
patients’ symptoms.133

decided to seek a divorce and then her condition improved. She did note that the rest
cure had lasting deleterious effects. Id.
127
HUBERT, supra note 23, at 64 (quoting CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN, THE
LIVING OF CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN 96 (1935)).
128
Theriot, supra note 9, at 10.
129
HUBERT, supra note 23, at 64 (quoting Suzanne Poirier, The Weir Mitchell Rest
Cure: Doctors and Patients, 10 WOMEN’S STUDIES 15, 35 (1983)).
130
GRONEMAN, supra note 26, at 21. One particularly gruesome type of surgery was
clitoridectomies (removal of the clitoris), which was a response to the “symptom” of
excessive sexual desire. Id.
131
Theriot, supra note 9, at 12.
132
Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing E. M. Roys Gavitt, Extraction of the Ovaries for
the Cure of Insanity, 1 WOMAN’S MED. J. 123-24 (1893)).
133
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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Alternatively, as a third treatment, in many cases, once women
fit the symptoms of these “female illnesses,” they were
institutionalized without any say in the matter.134 Again, this was an
explicit way in which those who surrounded women produced barriers
to female professional advancement. In one particularly shocking
case, two sane women were discovered to have been confined in a
mental hospital in Britain for “about 50 years each simply because
they had borne illegitimate children” in defiance of societal norms that
resulted in their committals as “mad” beings.135 However, tied to the
acceptance and self-diagnosis of the women themselves, these
seemingly barbaric “cures” were often not questioned by women
patients.136 It has been argued that the societal structure that relegated
women to a gender role of “learned helplessness” may be part of the
reason why these barbaric “cures” went unquestioned.137 Since
dependency has been supported and reinforced for women, as patients,
they may have been less likely to question these practices than men.
Further, historically, “women have not been permitted the
direct expression of aggression or assertion that men have been
allowed without feeling guilty or unfeminine.”138 So, even up to the
1950s-1970s in the United States, case studies show that women who
exhibited “opposite-sex traits such as anger, cursing, aggressiveness,
sexual love of women, increased sexuality in general, and a refusal to

134

See HUBERT, supra note 23, at 60.
Commitment practices in the nineteenth century placed additional
limitations on the lives of women. After a woman was declared insane, she
no longer had even the illusion of autonomy. Judges, lawyers, doctors, and
hospital staff defined the experiences of women mental patients, and the
women’s own explanations could be seen as symptoms of insanity.

Id.
135

PHYLLIS CHESLER, WOMEN AND MADNESS 162, 164 (1972). “The women’s
parents went to local government officials for help with their ‘wayward’ daughters,”
and the officials thus committed them. Id. at 162.
136
See Theriot, supra note 9, at 17 (noting that “[i]n many cases women came to
physicians asking to be committed”).
137
Little girls are also kept closer to their mothers than are little boys; they are
encouraged to seek support and are permitted to express dependency needs.
They have, in the past, grown up expecting that they will be cared for by
men. . . . To function more autonomously [] can therefore threaten a
woman’s sense of “femininity.”
Malkah Notman, Feminine Development: Changes in Psychoanalytic Theory, 2
WOMAN PATIENT 3, 21 n.58 (1982) (citing W. Grove, Sex Differences in the
Epidemiology of Mental Disorder: Evidence and Explanations, in GENDER &
DISORDERED BEHAVIOR 23 (E. S. Gomberg & V. Franks eds., 1979)).
138
Notman, supra note 137, at 20 (citing J. Zilbach, M. Notman, C. Nadelson, J.
Miller, Presentation at International Psychoanalytic Association: Reconsideration of
Aggression and Self-Esteem in Women (Aug. 1, 1979)).
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perform domestic and emotional-compassionate services” were
institutionalized.139
This sheds light on yet another factor influencing why women
experienced such immense obstacles in practicing law, even up until
the 1970s. This obstacle was grounded in biological understanding
and was extremely subtle, which is perhaps why it was not overtly
identified as a factor that impeded women’s progress in the law.
However, whether done consciously or not, a woman who exhibited
personality traits deemed “unnatural” to her gender was pronounced
“ill,” and entering a profession like the legal profession—one that was
grounded in reason and required independence, intelligence, and
autonomy—certainly challenged societal expectations for women.
D. How the Court Viewed Women as a Gender
When Belva Lockwood applied for admission to a federal court
in 1873, the court denied her claims and declared that “even
legislatures might not have authority over women’s legal status
because it was ‘by an unwritten law interwoven with the very fabric of
society;’ certainly, the court had no jurisdiction to admit a woman to
practise [sic] before it.”140 Furthermore, in 1875, when denying
Lavinia Goodell’s application to the bar in Wisconsin, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin drew language and reasoning from Bradwell v.
Illinois’141 discussion of “separate spheres.”142 The Supreme Court of
Wisconsin overtly stated:
There are many employments in life not unfit for
female character. The profession of the law is surely
not one of these. The peculiar qualities of womanhood,
its gentle graces, its quick sensibility, its tender
susceptibility, its purity, its delicacy, its emotional
impulses, its subordination of hard reason to
sympathetic feeling, are surely not qualifications for
forensic strife. Nature has tempered woman as little for
the judicial conflicts of the court room, as for the

139

CHESLER, supra note 135, at 164.
MARY JANE MOSSMAN, THE FIRST WOMEN LAWYERS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF GENDER, LAW AND THE LEGAL PROFESSIONS 49 (2006) (citing In re Lockwood, 9
Ct. Cl. 346, 355 (1873)).
141
83 U.S. 130 (1872).
142
In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 236-38 (Wis. 1875). “[T]he civil law, as well as
nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and
destinies of man and woman.” Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
140
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physical conflicts of the battle field. Womanhood is
moulded for gentler and better things . . . . [By
contrast, a court] has essentially and habitually to do
with all that is selfish and malicious, knavish and
criminal, coarse and brutal, repulsive and obscene, in
human life. It would be revolting to all female sense of
the innocence and sanctity of their sex, shocking to
man’s reverence for womanhood and faith in woman . .
. that woman should be permitted to mix professionally
in all the nastiness of the world which finds its way into
courts of justice.143
This pervasive understanding of womanhood as shaped by the
medical community’s diagnoses of “female illnesses” clearly shaped
the legal discourse about women entering the legal profession. The
very language that discussed the “peculiar qualities of womanhood”
identified women as other than men.144 The Supreme Court of
Wisconsin rooted this female peculiarity in “nature” and the very
fabric of society, thus grounding this understanding in science and
medicine.145 The Bradwell court echoed the same sentiments and
argued that to go against the natural order of men and women would in
fact affect the structure of the family and, thus, the structure of
society.146 “The harmony, not to say identity, of interest and views
which belong, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant
to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career from
that of her husband.”147
i.

Expert Testimony: Women’s Voices in the Medical Community—
Challenges and Contributions to Medical/Societal Understanding

Women physicians in the early medical profession may have
pushed back against some of the prevailing medical assumptions about
gender (much like their female counterparts did in the legal profession)
based on their personal experiences. Further, early women physicians
challenged medical wisdom with clinical studies and empirical
evidence, which led them to different conclusions than those of their
male counterparts and the rest of society. However, the views of

143

In re Goodell, 39 Wis. at 245-46 (emphasis added).
Id. at 245.
145
Id.
146
83 U.S. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
147
Id.
144
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women physicians were not taken seriously enough to rebut the gender
assumptions in court.
Some women physicians made observations that, had they been
adopted by society, would have directly counteracted the assumptions
that courts relied on in ruling against allowing women into the bar.148
In fact, these physicians noted, contrary to the court’s reasoning that
law would be too taxing and too dangerous for women to practice, that
“one cause of insanity was ‘monotony of work and thought,’
[including] ‘the treadmill of ceaseless care and toil to which so many
conscientious souls are self-condemned.’”149 In their findings, these
early women physicians primarily noted insanity in women who were
mothers, including those who had filled their gender role in their
“sphere” perfectly.150 They even gave a case study of a woman who
was deemed insane even while she “was a ‘most domestic woman’
much praised by her husband for her devotion to home and family.”151
Interestingly, their findings meant that women experienced
insanity, even within the separate sphere that the Court cited in
Bradwell, as a reason to keep women out of the legal profession in
order to protect women from the insanity that would stem from
overexerting themselves.152 This directly contradicts the medical
reasoning the court used to keep women out of the profession.
It is worth noting that it has been discussed that the disparities
of medical discourse between these early male and female physician
colleagues was not a war between “good science” and “bad science,”
but rather that “both women and men physicians formulated concepts
of women’s mental illness from their different positions in the medical
and gender power structures, positions that limited their vision even as
their vision helped define their positions.”153 Thus, while the views of
women physicians helped women receive better medical care, the
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Theriot, supra note 9, at 12 (referring to two women physicians: Grace Peckham,
a New York City physician, and Jennie McCowen, an assistant physician in Iowa);
see, e.g., Bradwell, 83 U.S. 130; In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232.
149
Theriot, supra note 9 (emphasis added) (quoting Jennie McCowen, The
Prevention of Insanity, 2 NW LANCET 14, 17 (1882-83)).
150
Id. “[O]ther women physicians argued that more education and greater freedom of
life choices would prevent most cases of female insanity and nervousness. Women
physicians took issue with their male colleagues who blamed women’s nervousness
on education.” Id. at 13.
151
Id. at 12 (quoting McCowen, supra note 149, at 17).
152
Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring) (“The natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of
the occupations of civil life.”).
153
Theriot, supra note 9, at 15.
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overall societal understanding of this medical science was slower to
evolve.154
ii.

Further Subjugation Within the Courts: Sexuality and
Nymphomania

This section exhibits how strongly societal norms and
preferences about gender shaped medical understandings. The desire
to promote the stable, societally-favored, nuclear family (and preserve
the role of the woman in that structure) influenced a medical
understanding that supported the nuclear family structure and
eschewed a medical understanding that would undermine or harm this
norm. A woman stepping outside her accepted societal sphere was
addressed swiftly in the courts.155 If a woman did not fulfill her role as
a wife and mother, either by seeking to become a professional or
because of her unsuitable sexual behavior, the courts further relied on
medical diagnoses.156 In this way, physicians “helped to legitimate a
code of sexual behavior based on rigid distinctions between feminine
and masculine activity.”157
One of the most prevalent ways that gender was medicalized
was through nymphomania. Nymphomania was one of the most
common diagnoses of “female illnesses” and was an attempt to define

154

Several states passed laws by the end of the century that required women
physicians to be appointed at state asylums to care for women patients. Id.
Importantly though, women physicians’ privileged class position played a role in
diagnosing female illnesses based on difference in living situations (privileged
women were too bored; less privileged women worked too hard). Id. at 15-16.
While this turned the diagnosis away from being purely based on sex, it was still
flawed by its reliance on class and its view that mental illnesses were indicative of a
failure of will or energy. Id.
155
See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872); In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232
(1875).
156
In a case for divorce because of the wife’s infidelity, the wife claimed insanity,
citing medical diagnoses that were gender-specific, including nymphomania. Wray
v. Wray, 19 Ala. 522, 524 (1851). “In her case there is evidence of insanity, as
contradistinguished from puerperal insanity, hysteria, moral insanity and
nymphomania, before and during the time which is material and afterwards. Several
of the physicians call it a case of moral insanity.” Id.; see also Laudo v. Laudo, 188
A.D. 699, 701 (N.Y. App. Div. 1919) (“To say the least, adultery committed under
the irresistible impulse of that morbid activity of the sexual propensity which is
called nymphomania, or more recently erotic mania, would certainly be ground for
divorce, though not of indictment.”).
157
GRONEMAN, supra note 26, at xix. Groneman also offers a discussion on the
history of nymphomania and how changing societal norms helped shape ideas of
masculinity and femininity, with a list of related resources. Id. at n.2.
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“excessive” female sexual desires as a disease.158 The medical
diagnosis of nymphomania had power, firstly, because it was
societally widespread. “Physicians writing for a popular audience
diagnosed nymphomania in those women who actively tried to attract
men by wearing perfume, adorning themselves, or talking of
marriage.”159 Further, nymphomania made its way into the courts and
into legislation as a disease in multiple contexts.160 However, what is
interesting is that “the male equivalent of nymphomania, satyriasis,
was diagnosed far less frequently and treated quite differently.
Specifically, the symptoms of flirting, seductive glances, and other
behavior sometimes labeled nymphomania in women did not
constitute a disease in men.”161 This widespread acceptance of
nymphomania, and other gender-related illnesses, impacted early
female lawyers because it meant that they had barriers, placed by
courts, on their personal life choices, such as their sexuality, as well as
on their professional progress.
Even women adopted and accepted these diagnoses based on
their gender, and this acceptance was indoctrinated in the courtroom.
Whether overt or subconscious, this acceptance is expressed even in
the legal community’s discussion and understanding of sex and
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Carol Groneman, Nymphomania: The Historical Construction of Female
Sexuality, 19 SIGNS 337, 337 (1994). While nymphomania was a specific organic
disease with an assumed set of symptoms, causes, and treatments, defining
“excessive” female sexual desire was a fairly ambiguous concept, meaning that the
symptoms and treatments reached into many aspects of female behavior. Id.
159
Id. at 341.
160
The most common context was rape, where nymphomania acted as a defense for
the accused rapist to weaken the rape claim. If a female was diagnosed with
nymphomania, her claim of rape was likely unfounded because she was unnaturally
sexually driven and, thus, could not have been raped or likely had given her consent.
See GRONEMAN, supra note 26, at xx-xxi; see also Berger, supra note 7, at 15-20
(discussing how courts considered a rape victim’s character for chastity as a major
factor in rape cases). Nymphomania also made its way into the courts as a defense
for women in divorce cases based on adultery. See Wray, 19 Ala. at 524; Laudo, 188
A.D. at 701; Chew v. State, 804 S.W.2d 633, 634 (Tex. App. 1991). During the trial
of Chew v. State, the appellant presented the testimony of Dr. Lawrence Taylor, a
qualified psychiatrist with expertise in sexual disorders. 804 S.W.2d at 634. Dr.
Taylor described the illness of “nymphomania” as a condition occasionally found in
females, consisting of an unmanageable sexual desire that results in dramatic
frequency of sexual contact with a partner as well as indiscriminate sexual contact
with groups. Id. Dr. Taylor testified that it was not uncommon for females afflicted
with this illness to attempt to hide their condition from the general public as well as
from their own family, and further, that those afflicted very seldom seek medical
attention on their own. Id. Further, the doctor stated that “a female so afflicted
could possibly be raped but that it was not probable.” Id.
161
See GRONEMAN, supra note 26, at xx-xxi.
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gender, but most explicitly in Bradwell v. Illinois. There the court
explicitly stated:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always
recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres
and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be,
woman’s protector and defender. The natural and
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the
occupations of civil life.162
The stress on nature’s recognition of the limitations placed on a
woman was what tied this legal understanding into the medical one.
The legal reasoning pulled from the scientific one, almost as if relying
on expert testimony about the very genetic and biological makeup of
women.
When the medical community stressed that women
“naturally” do not have the disposition to do, think, or express
sexuality in the same way that men do, because of something innate in
their biological makeup—their reproductive organs—the court inferred
that it had justification to use women’s biological makeup as a
rationale to keep women out of the legal profession.163 Because this
faulty societal understanding of women stemmed from a profession as
grounded in science and in facts as the medical profession, it was
indoctrinated into common law to squelch women’s attempts to step
outside the gender norm.
V. CONCLUSION AND NEXT STEPS
Medicalization of gender, then, impacted women in three
distinct ways: through self-diagnosis and the application of
medicalization of their gender; through external, societal application of
medicalization of their gender; and through legal application of
medicalization of their gender. The threefold influence from the
medical community was both subtle and pervasive. It made women
patients and women doctors part of the very discourse about women’s
health that was used to subjugate women from within the legal system.
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Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 US 130, 141 (1872).
See Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring) (“The natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of
the occupations of civil life.”); In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 245 (1875) (“The
peculiar qualities of womanhood, its gentle graces, its quick sensibility, its tender
susceptibility, its purity, its delicacy, its emotional impulses, its subordination of
hard reason to sympathetic feeling, are surely not qualifications for forensic strife.”).
163
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Again, this paper does not posit that an all-male legal system was
pitted against women to subjugate them and relegate them to
societally-approved roles. Nor does this paper argue that the
subjugation was purposeful or overt. The subjugation was likely
fueled simply by a subconscious desire to maintain the status quo of
societal structure, which the cyclical influence between the medical
community and societal norms continued to impact. However, there is
value in having a conversation about the possible barriers to women’s
advancement in the legal profession that may have perhaps not been
discussed in this context before.
These observations expose that, at the very least, the first
women lawyers who sought entrance into the legal system had two
major barriers to overcome: the indoctrinated and medically-supported
view that the rest of society understood that women did not have the
capacity to succeed in law as well as their own understandings about
their limited capacities based on gender.164 This is exhibited
especially clearly in the concerns voiced by early female lawyers about
whether or not their health could withstand the practice.165 This
concern unfortunately echoed in some of the double binds that still
hold women back today, such as the assumption that a woman can
have a family or a career, but not both. This understanding arguably
stems from the “natural” order of the sexes, as the understanding of
gender gave women a positive side—“sentiment and morality”—as
well as a negative side—“ignorance and lack of intellectual
powers.”166
These societal assumptions about women, based on a pseudoscientific understanding about physical and mental capacities of the
sexes, shaped not only societal roles, but also strongly biased opinions
of whether women had the capacity to succeed in the law. The
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Similar, dually-imposed diagnosis obstacles are also exhibited in women rape
victims’ experiences in the courtroom. Women rape victims were not only
diagnosed as deviant by physicians, but were also made to doubt their own
testimonies and self-diagnose themselves as deviant. GRONEMAN, supra note 26, at
98-99 (citing JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 3 EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 736
(4th ed. 1970)). Wigmore referred to experts on the female psyche to support his
theories that science held the answer to false claims of rape. Id. at 99; see also
HUBERT, supra note 23, at 58 (“Psychiatrists exerted such influence that . . . .
women internalized societal and psychiatric oppression and testified against
themselves in their [psychological] narratives.”).
165
See Drachman, supra note 1 (discussing the professional and personal challenges
nineteenth-century female lawyers faced).
166
McLaughlin, supra note 96, at 250 (citing L.J. Jordanova, Natural Facts: A
Historical Perspective on Science and Sexuality, in NATURE, CULTURE, AND GENDER
42, 50 (Carol P. MacCormack & Marilyn Strathern eds., 1980).
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assumptions about the very structure of the legal profession were (and
are) that the legal profession was founded in objectivity, rationality,
and with a “gentlemanly” disposition. This understanding of which
traits were necessary to succeed in the law explains why a societal and
medical understanding that women were emotional, irrational, and
flighty set such a high barrier for women entering the profession.167
Much of the value in researching the impact that medical
understanding of gender has had on our legal system is to begin a
discussion of it in relation to the modern-day struggles of women in
the legal system. While science and medicine have greatly progressed
as of 2015, many deep-rooted norms, such as medicating women more
readily than men, still remain. Gender-biased diagnosing, “a tendency
for physicians and other health care professionals to mislabel women’s
somatic complaints as non-serious and/or psychosomatic . . . has
received considerable attention.”168 Studies have shown that the
pervasiveness’ of this gender-bias even impacts women selfidentifying symptoms as serious, for fear of being labeled a
hypochondriac due to gender bias, ultimately seriously threatening
their health.169 While it may not be overt, this historical influence may
still affect women lawyers today.170 In order to understand and
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This medical understanding also impacted the treatment of women as victims of
rape in the courts. An assumption that a woman was inherently emotional, irrational,
and flighty meant that rape laws would evolve to mean that the woman’s word was
not to be trusted within the courts, culminating in legislation implementing the
corroboration requirement. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
168
Shari Munch, Gender-Biased Diagnosing of Women’s Medical Complaints:
Contributions of Feminist Thought, 1970-1995, 40 WOMEN & HEALTH 101, 102
(2004).
169
Amanda Marcotte, Women May Not Seek Help for Heart Attacks Because They
Fear Being Seen as Hypochondriacs, SLATE.COM (Feb. 25, 2015, 1:56 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2015/02/25/women_and_heart_attacks_study_
suggests_they_don_t_seek_help_for_fear_of.html; see also Maanvi Singh, Younger
Women Hesitate to Say They’re Having a Heart Attack, NPR.ORG (Feb. 24, 2015,
4:26 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2015/02/24/388787045/younger-womenhesitate-to-say-theyre-having-a-heart-attack (citing Judith H. Lichtman et al.,
Symptom Recognition and Healthcare Experiences of Young Women with Acute
Myocardial Infarction, 8 CIRCULATION: CARDIOVASCULAR QUALITY AND
OUTCOMES 1 (2015)) (“‘It's interesting because the whole idea of female hysteria
dates back to ancient times,’ Tremmel says. ‘This is an ongoing issue in the medical
field, and we all have to empower women patients, so they know that they need to
not be so worried about going to the hospital if they're afraid there's something
wrong.’”).
170
“Today, ‘[w]omen are 48% more likely than men to be prescribed a narcotic,
antianxiety, or other potentially abusable drug.’” KATIE DARCY, GENDER,
LEADERSHIP AND ADDICTION IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 15 (2013) (citing
STEPHANIE S. COVINGTON, WOMEN & ADDICTION: A GENDER-RESPONSIVE
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deconstruct the barriers that still influence women lawyers today, it is
necessary to look at the barriers’ origins. Clearly, the medical
community has had perhaps more of an influence on societal structure
than has been realized or studied in the context of the legal profession.
The fact that language that subtly references “nature” and “science”
found its way into the courtroom, and into common law as a basis to
preclude women from entering the legal profession, indicates that
medicalization was a significant barrier to early women lawyers. It
may, to some extent, still be a barrier to women lawyers today and
may help unpack why women still have not reached parity with men in
the legal profession.
This is a conversation that should be ongoing. Identifying
every possible factor that could hold women back from reaching parity
with men in the same profession has value. However, many of these
barriers are extremely subtle or have never been identified in the
context of women in the law. Only by addressing every aspect of
society that may have played a part in forming a barrier for early
women lawyers will it be possible to address the barriers that exist
today.

APPROACH 14 (2007)), available at http://www.law.msu.edu/king/20122013/Darcy.pdf.

